Europos Parlamento narės Laimos Andrikienės kalba EP Saugumo ir gynybos pakomitetyje, sausio 24 d. Briuselyje, apie prognozes dėl Kinijos karinės galios pasaulyje.
Keitimasis nuomonėmis įvyko dalyvaujant:
– EIVT Kinijos, Honkongo, Makao, Taivano, Mongolijos skyriaus vadovo pavaduotojui Christophe Manet,
– ES saugumo studijų instituto (ESSSI) vyresniajai analitikei Evai Pejsovai,
– korporacijos RAND vyresniajam mokslo darbuotojui Andrew Scobellui.
I would first of all like to thank our speakers for their contributions. I have to say that this week in the European Parliament looks like it is overshadowed by China and the OBOR strategy because we discussed in the International Trade Committee the Foreign direct investment screening mechanism, that we would like to have in the European Union. We already see and observe those consequences in the European Union and in our EU Member States.
I am from Lithuania which is at the Baltic Sea and many of my compatriots think that the huge country China does not see the small Lithuania at the Baltic Sea and our Klaipeda seaport, an ice-free port and, at the same time, we are getting more and more information that the Klaipeda seaport is at the end of one of the transport corridors and is part of the implementation of the OBOR strategy. Even our Prime Minister was very recently invited to Budapest to meet the Prime Minister of China and Lithuania finally signed a protocol of intention, as part of the implementation of the OBOR strategy. As we can see, we are also part of this big game and of course we are concerned about the consequences.
I would also like to mention that the situation in East Asia has recently changed dramatically. Those changes include North Korea and of course China’s rising military profile, the issue you addressed today, the military profile in the region including its recent unilateral decision to begin using controversial aviation routes of the Taiwanese coast. I think it’s this unilateral breach of the 2015 agreement is one more example of China’s intention to increase its power in the region by using non-military means. This causes serious concerns as the breach is seen as China’s attempt to cover its military and political intentions towards Taiwan under the pretext of civil aviation.
If Taiwan actually tries to seek full independence – we know that the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, whose party is advocating the independence of Taiwan, has said during the election campaign – the Chinese government has promised to use force. In recent months, China has increased patrols by military aircraft near Taiwan, including bombers. China also continues to step up efforts seeking to isolate Taiwan by forcing big multinational corporations that do business in China, including the Marriott Hotel chain and Delta Airlines, to remove Taiwan from lists of countries on their websites.
So, I have a few questions to Mr. Manet: First of all, what is the EU’s reaction to the unilateral change of the status quo that destabilised the region? How does the EEAS evaluate the tensions between China and Taiwan? Was there any response or were there any diplomatic measures taken by the EU as a reaction to the latest breach of the agreement? Because we fully understand that it would make sense for Taiwan to raise concerns about the new route with the International civil aviation organisation, the United Nations body that oversees international air routes, but at the same time Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and Taiwan has no formal ties with the aviation body itself, which is headed by Fang Liu, a Chinese citizen who since 2016 has denied Taiwan an observer status.
And my question to the other experts is, how do you evaluate China’s actions towards Taiwan?